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Abstract  
 
Previous research has shown adverse effects of growing up under unilateral divorce laws on 
long-term outcomes of children. It remains an open question of whether long-term effects of 
early childhood conditions arise because divorce laws raise the likelihood of parental marital 
disruption,  or  whether  unilateral  divorce  laws  also  affect  children  in  intact  marriages  by 
changing  intra-household  bargaining.  Using  newly  available  data  from  SHARELIFE  for 
eleven  Western  European  countries  we  address  this  question  employing  a  differences-in-
differences approach and controlling for childhood family structure and socioeconomic status. 
Like previous research, we find strong adverse effects of growing up under unilateral divorce 
laws  on  the  well-being  of  children,  and  this  effect  remains  even  when  controlling  for 
childhood variables. We conclude that unilateral divorce laws affect children by changing 
family bargaining in intact marriages.  
 
                                                 
* This paper uses data from SHARELIFE release 1, as of November 24th 2010 or SHARE release 2.4.0, as of 
March 17th 2011. The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through 
the 5th framework programme (project QLK6-CT-2001- 00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life), 
through the 6th framework programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT- 2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-
2005-028857,  and  SHARELIFE,  CIT4-CT-2006-028812)  and  through  the  7th  framework  programme 
(SHARE-PREP, 211909 and SHARE-LEAP, 227822). Additional funding from the U.S. National Institute on 
Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 and OGHA 04-
064, IAG BSR06-11, R21 AG025169) as well as from various national sources is gratefully acknowledged 
(see www.share-project.org for a full list of funding institutions).   2 
Introduction 
There is now a large body of  literature showing a negative association between parental 
divorce and children outcomes such as well-being and education (for a meta-analysis see 
Amato and Keith 1991 and Amato 2001). Furthermore, there is some evidence that liberalized 
divorce laws in the US (Gruber 2004) and Europe (González and Viitanen 2008) had  an 
adverse effect on children’s outcomes. It is an open question, however, whether this effect 
arises because liberalized divorce laws lead to more divorces or because liberalized divorce 
laws change the bargaining process within the household and the investment into children’s 
human  capital  (Gruber  2004)  or  both.    In  this  paper  we  address  this  latter  question  by 
exploiting cross-national variation in the introduction of unilateral divorce laws across Europe 
using  a  difference-in-differences  approach  and  newly  available  data  from  SHARELIFE 
containing information on family composition and socioeconomic status during childhood. 
Controlling  for  these  childhood  variables  allows  us  to  address  the  question  about  the 
mechanism by which liberalized divorce laws affect children’s well-being, a question which 
could not be answered with the data used in Gruber (2004) and González and Viitanen (2008). 
Using SHARELIFE data has the additional advantage that we can study the long-term effects 
of  divorce  legislation  over  much  of  the  life-cycle  as  the  respondents  are  50+  years  old 
whereas typically studies analyzed outcomes in childhood or in young adulthood. We focus 
on long-term outcomes similar to the ones that have been studied in the literature before: 
physical and mental health and health behavior (Dawson 1991, Chase-Lansdale et al. 1995, 
Cherlin et al. 1998), demographic outcomes (Keith and Finlay 1988, Cherlin et al. 1995, 
Kiernan and Cherlin 1999), and education (Keith and Finlay 1988).  
There are three main explanations for the negative effect of divorce on children’s outcomes 
(Amato and Keith 1991):  First, usually one parent leaves the household and there is less 
contact between this parent and the child, and furthermore, the custodial parent may also have 
competing  demands  on  her  time  reducing  the  parental  time  spent  with  children.  Second,   3 
divorces  are  usually  associated  with  economic  hardship  resulting  in  lower  investments  in 
children’s  human  capital.  Third,  some  argue  that  it  is  not  divorce  per  se  that  is  hurting 
children but family conflicts which lead to a disruption. While some of the literature has 
controlled for pre-disruption household variables (Chase-Lansdale et al. 1995, Cherlin et al. 
1998, Kiernan and Cherlin 1999, Cherlin et al. 1995) there is still the worry that there may be 
unobserved factors driving both parental marital disruptions and child well-being. In addition, 
policy  makers  cannot  affect  marital  disruptions  per  se  but  can  only  reform  divorce 
legislations. For these reasons, some researchers have started looking at the effects of divorce 
legislation on children’s outcomes (Gruber 2004, González and Viitanen 2008). Similarly to 
the  United  States,  many  European  countries  moved  from  mutual  consent  divorce  laws  to 
unilateral divorce laws mainly in the 1970’s. Under mutual consent law, both partners had to 
agree to a divorce while under unilateral law one spouse can leave the marriage without the 
other’s consent.  
Only if unilateral divorce laws effectively raised divorce rates there would be a possibility 
that  divorce  legislation  affects  children  via  this  channel.  However,  there  is  an  ongoing 
controversy  whether  unilateral  divorce  laws  have  in  fact  increased  divorce  rates.  Becker 
(1993) argues that under Coasian bargaining there should be no changes in divorce rates. 
Rather, the introduction of unilateral divorce laws merely shifts the property rights within 
marriages. Whereas under mutual consent divorce laws the spouse wanting out had to bribe 
the other he or she can leave unilaterally under the new law. However, in both cases only 
inefficient marriages are dissolved. Initially, there was support for the notion that unilateral 
divorce laws lead to an increase in divorce rates (Peters 1986, Friedberg 1998) which was 
usually interpreted as evidence for some violations of the assumptions of Coase’s theorem (no 
transaction  costs,  transferability  of  utility,  no  informational  asymmetries).  Wolfers  (2006) 
shows, however, that the increase in divorce rates was not sustained in the United States. 
Using the same empirical strategy as Wolfers, Kneip and Bauer (2009) and González and   4 
Viitanen (2009) find a sustained effect of unilateral divorce laws on divorce rates in Western 
Europe pointing either to a violation of the applicability of Coase’s theorem or other indirect 
effects of unilateral divorce laws for instance because of depressed investments in marriage-
specific capital, e.g. decreasing marital fertility. If the change in unilateral divorce laws lead 
to an increase in divorce rates and divorce itself is bad for children then we expect negative 
consequences of the change in divorce laws on children’s outcomes in Europe.  
Regarding the second pathway through which unilateral divorce laws can affect children’s 
outcomes Gruber (2004) discusses the relative bargaining position of both spouses and the 
resulting allocation of resources and time within the household. If unilateral divorce laws shift 
resources away from mothers there could be a negative effect on children. Furthermore, under 
unilateral divorce law women may have a higher incentive to invest in their careers and thus 
they may also invest less time in household production, fertility, and raising children. Kneip, 
Bauer, and Reinhold (2011) show that the shift to unilateral divorce laws has increased female 
labor force participation in Europe. But there could also be beneficial effects of unilateral 
divorce laws on children’s outcomes. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006), for instance, show that 
there is less distress and physical abuse in families under unilateral divorce laws because it is 
easier  for  spouses  to  leave  abusive  marriages.  They  do  not  investigate  directly  the 
consequences of those changes on children’s outcomes but it is plausible that for children in 
such relationships outcomes may improve overall. Furthermore, Rasul (2005) argues that the 
change of divorce laws may also lead to a better selection into marriages, a notion for which 
Kneip et al. (2011) find support using SHARELIFE data. Thus, in the long-run the average 
match quality in marriages may improve and divorce rates may even fall. Children growing 
up in these better matched marriages may have better outcomes. It is not clear, however, what 
the average effect on all children would be in this case if there are also more children born 
out-of-wedlock or in cohabiting unions.    5 
The question of how divorce laws affect children’s outcomes is also of great policy interest. 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) argue that governments can use divorce laws to influence intra-
family distribution and well-being of individuals within marriage by shaping their respective 
position after marital disruption. Understanding the effects of unilateral divorce may then also 
shed  light  on  other  current  reforms  of  divorce  and  family  laws  in  Europe.  For  instance, 
alimony laws were recently reformed in Germany restricting alimonies for homemakers. This 
would give additional incentives for women to invest in their careers with potentially similar 
effects on children’s outcomes than the shift to unilateral divorce. Thus, it seems to be crucial 
to assess the impact of family policies and divorce laws on intra-household bargaining to 
better understand the impact of other social policies on children’s outcomes.  
1  Changes in Divorce Laws in Europe 
Divorce  laws  have  undergone  several  changes  in  Europe  in  about  the  last  century. 
Historically, the first, and maybe most significant, was the introduction of divorce as a legal 
act, which occurred quite early in most countries. A second change concerns the introduction 
of “no-fault” grounds for divorce. By the mid of the 20th century those had been adopted by 
the majority of countries; the remainder followed during the second half of the century. No-
fault grounds were sometimes intended as additional to fault grounds,  but most countries 
eventually installed them in replacement thereof. Moreover, where fault grounds have been 
kept, they have been used decreasingly and usually do not affect the question of alimony 
payments (Goode, 1993, p. 32). The third change has been a shift from a divorce legislation 
that  requires  mutual  consent  to  one  that  allows  for  unilateral  divorce.  Apart  from  a  few 
outriders and laggards this change mainly took place in the 70s and early 80s. Although the 
shift from mutual-consent to unilateral law is often confused with a shift from fault to no-fault 
law in the literature (perhaps due to the historical concurrence of their introduction in many 
legislations), they are conceptionally different. Theoretically, it is the shift to unilateral law 
that is of main interest here, as it affects the assignment of property rights and, with this, the   6 
bargaining  power  of  spouses.  Consequently,  this  specific  time-varying  characteristic 
constitutes the key explanatory variable of the following analyses. We apply the same coding 
of this variable as used by Kneip and Bauer (2009), focusing on what they call a de facto 
unilateral divorce regime. Such a regime is defined as one in which it is possible to file for 
divorce without the consent of one’s spouse. Divorce will then not follow automatically but 
can be expected to be granted by judicial verdict if certain requirements (like a specified 
period of separation) are fulfilled. 
2  Data and Empirical Methods  
2.1  Data 
For  our  analysis,  we  use  data  from  SHARELIFE  to  obtain  measures  for  demographic 
outcomes, childhood family structure, and socioeconomic status. We match these data to data 
from waves 1 and 2 from SHARE which contains information on educational attainment, 
health  and  health  behavior.  We  restrict  our  sample  to  Austria,  Germany,  Sweden, 
Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland and Belgium for which we 
have information on the de facto switch to unilateral divorce law regimes from Kneip and 
Bauer (2009). This sample restriction results in 14881 to 21326 observations depending on 
the outcome of interest. Summary statistics on the main variables of interest can be found in 
table 1 for individuals growing up before and after de facto unilateral divorce laws have been 
introduced. Overall, it is hard to ascertain whether growing up under unilateral divorce entails 
disadvantages for children because cohort effects confound this innovation in family law.   
2.2  Empirical Methods 
We employ a differences-in-differences approach where we estimate a basic model of the 
form: 




ac c c a ac iac u X cohort KIDUNI CO d h h h b a ' * '    
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where CO is an outcome for an individual i of cohort a living in country c, KIDUNI is a 
dummy variable indicating whether unilateral divorce law was in effect when the individual 
was 18 years old, ηa  and ηc  are cohort and country fixed effects, respectively,  ac c cohort * h  is 
a linear cohort trend,  and X contains additional control variables capturing the individuals’ 
socioeconomic status of her parents during childhood and an indicator for living together with 
both biological parents at age 10. By controlling for these individual characteristics of the 
household during childhood it is possible to control for one mechanism by which unilateral 
divorce laws affect children’s well being. If these laws increase the likelihood of parental 
marital disruption, and this is the only mechanism, then the coefficients on the childhood 
variables  should  absorb  much  of  the  effect  of  unilateral  divorce  laws  and  render  the 
coefficient  on  exposure  to  unilateral  divorce  law  as  a  child  small  and  statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, if the coefficient on unilateral divorce law is hardly changed 
after  the  inclusion  of  additional  control  variables  for  childhood  family  structure  and 
socioeconomic status, then it is likely that unilateral divorce laws affect children also in intact 
marriages, for instance by affecting the bargaining positions of spouses. Another potential 
advantage of controlling for childhood variables is to increase precision of estimates if these 
variables are important predictors of long-term outcomes. 
In addition to the availability of childhood variables, the use of SHARELIFE data has several 
advantages but also disadvantages compared to Gruber’s (2004) use of US census data. First 
of all, using cross-national variation has the marked disadvantage that the European countries 
are potentially less homogenous than the 50 US states. Therefore, the assumption that the 
treatment group countries would have followed the same trend as control group countries if 
there had been no introduction of unilateral divorce laws is more likely to be violated. We 
therefore test our results by checking whether the exact definition of the control groups in our 
experimental setting has a great influence on our results. Restricting our sample to groups of 
more  homogenous  countries,  as  for  instance  Scandinavia,  gives  more  confidence  in  our   8 
results. The use of cross-national European data is also a virtue compared to US census data. 
The US census only contains state of birth and state of residence and therefore results could 
be biased because of selective migration in this kind of analysis (Gruber 2004, Heckman, 
Layne-Farrar,  and  Todd  1996).  This  problem  should  be  less  severe  because  there  is  less 
migration across national borders in Europe as there is migration across state borders in the 
United  States.  Furthermore,  migration  in  Europe  is  probably  not  related  to  differences  in 
divorce laws as usually the divorce laws of the country where the marriage is contracted are 
applied (González and Viitanen 2009).    
3  Results 
The results for the basic model specification are shown in Table 2, panel A. In the first row, 
results are shown for a basic model without further covariates and without a country-specific 
linear trend. According to these estimates, unilateral divorce law has no appreciable effect on 
adults’  completed  education,  overweight,  self-rated  health,  or  depressive  symptoms.  One 
finds, however, marked effects on the probability of ever being married (-3 percentage points) 
and having kids (-5 percentage points). Furthermore, individuals growing up under unilateral 
divorce laws have a marked reduction of ever starting smoking (-6 percentage points). These 
results  are  not  strongly  affected  by  the  inclusion  of  controls  for  family  structure  and 
socioeconomic status during childhood (panel B), except for the effect on overweight which 
increases in size and becomes statistically significant, perhaps because the estimates get more 
precise. Growing up under unilateral divorce increases the probability of being overweight 
later on in life (+4 percentage points). 
---Table 2 about here--- 
This leads us tentatively to conclude that the effect of unilateral divorce laws on children’s 
outcomes  is  mainly  driven  by  their  effects  on  intra-household  bargaining  in  existing 
marriages. Gruber (2004) uses a back-of-the-envelope calculation to gauge whether changes 
in divorce probabilities can account for the effects on children’s outcomes and comes to a   9 
similar conclusion than we do. Gruber finds quite substantial effects of unilateral divorce laws 
on  children’s  later-life  outcomes,  but  only  relatively  small  effects  on  the  likelihood  of 
parental,  marital  disruption.  If  unilateral  divorce  laws  affect  later  life  outcomes  only  by 
changing this probability then parental divorce would have to have a very large effect because 
only a small group is affected but one finds relatively large effects in the whole population. 
He concludes that these effects would have to be too large to be credible leading him to 
believe  that  unilateral  divorce  laws  must  also  affect  the  outcomes  of  children  in  intact 
marriages. Our results are re-assuring for his conclusion because he was not able to directly 
use micro-data on whether the children’s parents have in fact separated. Our results for health 
behaviors also mirror Gruber’s results for the United States who has also shown some adverse 
effects on adults who have grown up under unilateral divorce. However, we find exactly the 
opposite effect on family formation and child bearing than Gruber did. Whereas he found 
earlier marriages and earlier children, we find that individuals growing up under unilateral 
divorce are less likely to get married and they also have fewer children.  
4  Robustness Checks 
In this section, we probe the robustness of our results. We first use an alternative specification 
of exposure to unilateral divorce laws in youth as our explanatory variable, second, we check 
different  specifications  of  country-specific  cohort  effects  whether  unobserved  trends  are 
driving our results, and third, we restrict our samples to get more homogenous control groups. 
4.1  Alternative Specification of Exposure to Unilateral Divorce 
Laws 
Our definition of exposure to unilateral divorce laws is somewhat arbitrary. It takes the value 
of 1 if unilateral divorce laws were in place  when the individual was  18  years old, zero 
otherwise. This basic specification facilitates comparison with Gruber (2004) and González 
and Viitanen, however, at the same time we lose valuable identifying information. As an   10 
alternative specification, we construct a variable measuring the years of exposure to unilateral 
divorce laws before the 18
th birthday.
†  The results are presented in table 3. 
---Table 3 about here--- 
The results using this alternative specification are qualitatively similar to the results of the 
basic specification. We find strong effects of exposure to unilateral divorce laws on family 
formation and the probability of having kids. Because we do have little theoretical guidance 
which is the correct measure of childhood exposure to unilateral divorce laws it is reassuring 
that the exact definition does not seem to play a major role in driving our main results. 
 
4.2  Country-Specific Trends 
Another  concern  with  our  identification  strategy  is  that  there  are  no  unobserved  country-
specific cohort trends which are correlated with the change in unilateral divorce laws. There 
are a couple of noteworthy policy initiatives in Europe affecting our outcomes which are 
potentially  correlated  with  changes  in  unilateral  divorce  laws.  All  European  countries 
experienced an educational expansion during this period potentially masking the effects of the 
changes in unilateral divorce laws. The extension of mandatory schooling which roughly falls 
into the same period (see for instance Pischke and von Wachter 2008). For Germany, Jürges, 
Reinhold, and Salm (2009) and Kemptner, Jürges, and Reinhold have found a positive effect 
of education on health behavior when using school constructions or mandatory schooling, 
respectively,  as  instruments.  Thus,  our  results  for  unilateral  divorce  laws  are  potentially 
tainted those by policies happening at the same time as changes in divorce laws.  While we do 
not want to model the potential effects of those other policy initiatives, we use more flexible 
country  specific  cohort  trends  to  control  in  a  flexible  way  for  those  policy  changes.  In 
                                                 
† Notice that there is a second interpretation of this variable, as it implicitly is also a control for the age of the 
individual when unilateral divorce laws were introduced. In our data set we cannot distinguish between those 
opportunities.   11 
particular,  we  include  linear,  quadratic  and  cubic  country-specific  cohort  trends  in  our 
specifications. These results are presented in Table 4. 
---Table 4--- 
We find that the coefficient estimates on unilateral divorce laws are remarkably stable when 
controlling for a linear or quadratic trend. However, when including a cubic trend some of our 
estimates lose statistical significance. However, in most cases even though the coefficient 
estimates are not significant anymore, the point estimates are still rather close to the point 
estimates when not controlling for country-specific trends. Therefore, we do not think that our 
results are mainly driven by unobserved country specific trends which are correlated with 
unilateral divorce laws. 
 
4.3  Sample Restrictions 
4.3.1  Dropping Southern Europe 
One  concern  with  our  estimates  is  that  identification  relies  on  the  usual  assumption  of 
differences-in-differences estimates that we have found a suitable control group. In our case, 
identification mainly hinges on Denmark and the Netherlands while the other countries are 
either always in the treatment group (Sweden) or remain in the control group. In particular, 
the question arises whether Southern European countries are a good control group for the 
experiences in Denmark and the Netherlands. There are large religious differences between 
Southern Europe and Denmark and the Netherlands, and in addition divorce became only 
legal in Spain after the end of the Franco period in 1981. At the same time, economic growth 
was faster in Spain after it got admitted to the EU. Therefore, trends in outcomes could very 
well  differ  between  Southern  Europe  and  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands  violating  the 
assumptions behind the differences-in-differences approach. 
We therefore present additional results where we drop the Southern European countries from 
our analysis. The results are presented in table 5   12 
---Table 5 about here--- 
Overall, it does not appear that the exclusion of Southern European countries from our sample 
affects the results much. In contrast to the complete sample, the effect on overweight becomes 
insignificant but the effects on smoking and family formation are remarkably similar to our 
baseline results.  
4.3.2  Restrict Sample to Denmark and Sweden 
We can even go one step further and restrict our sample to just Denmark and Sweden which 
are  probably  the  two  most  homogenous  countries  in  our  sample.  Sweden  had  introduced 
unilateral divorce already in 1915 and thus serves as a control group for Denmark introducing 
unilateral divorce in the 1970’s. The results for this robustness check are presented in table  6. 
---Table 6 about here--- 
When restricting the sample to Denmark and Sweden, we use robust standard errors because 
estimation of clustered standard errors becomes too problematic with two clusters. Overall we 
confirm our previous results about the effect of unilateral divorce on health behaviors and 
family  formation.  In  addition,  we  find  a  negative  effect  of  unilateral  divorce  laws  on 
educational attainment similar to Gruber’s results for the United States.  
5  Conclusion 
Starting from Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) theoretical insight that the welfare of divorced 
parents has an effect on intra-household allocation of intact marriages we examine the change 
in unilateral divorce laws in Europe and its effect on children’s outcomes. Theoretically, it is 
not clear how this shift in property rights within marriages should affect children’s welfare as 
there are opposing forces at work. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) show a reduction in family 
distress  after  the  introduction  of  unilateral  divorce  laws,  and  Rasul  (2005)  argues  that 
marriages should be better matched after the introduction of unilateral divorce regimes. While 
we cannot investigate the development of family distress in our data set, we find some support 
for Rasul’s notion that average match quality in marriages increases in a companion paper   13 
(Kneip, Bauer, and Reinhold 2011). On the other hand, this study also finds an increase in 
female  labor  force  participation  in  response  to  the  introduction  of  unilateral  divorce,  and 
Gruber (2004) finds negative effects of unilateral divorce laws on children’s welfare in the 
United States. Overall, our results are confirming Gruber’s results for the United States as we 
find sizable negative effects of the exposure to unilateral divorce laws on health behavior of 
children and, at least for the Scandinavian countries, on educational attainment. These results 
are not driven by the effect on unilateral divorce laws on the probability of parental separation 
because  if  we  condition  on  living  in  an  intact  family  at  age  10  our  estimates  are  hardly 
changed. We therefore conclude that the introduction of unilateral divorce laws changed the 
interactions  of  parents  within  the  household  and  reduced  investments  into  children,  for 
instance because less time is spent with children as both parents have to work full-time to 
maintain their outside options as marriage has lost part of its insurance value. Notice that our 
data do not allow us to investigate Rasul’s hypothesis further for the parents of the individuals 
in our sample regarding improved selection into marriage because all their parents would have 
married before the introduction of unilateral divorce laws, except in Sweden. For younger 
cohorts this may play a role with an ambiguous effect on overall child welfare: it would be 
beneficial for children born in wedlock but potentially detrimental to children out-of-wedlock. 
If  more  children  are  born  out-of-wedlock  after  the  introduction  of  unilateral  divorce  the 
overall effect can even be negative.  
Our estimates have important policy implications as more recently family policies have again 
been  the  focus  of  attention  of  policy-makers.  For  instance,  alimony  payments  have  been 
reformed in Germany recently. In light of our results, this may also affect children in intact 
families as it affects the bargaining position of women within the household. []   14 
6  Tables 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
       
  De facto unilateral divorce law in 
effect at age 18 
 
  0  1  Total 
Years of 
schooling 
9.701  11.09  9.876 
  (4.628)  (3.286)  (4.504) 
       
Ever married  0.941  0.915  0.937 
  (0.236)  (0.279)  (0.242) 
       
Has kids  0.871  0.870  0.871 
  (0.335)  (0.337)  (0.335) 
       
Never smoked  0.511  0.411  0.499 
  (0.500)  (0.492)  (0.500) 
       
Overweight  0.631  0.573  0.624 
  (0.483)  (0.495)  (0.484) 
       
Self-rated health  0.133  0.228  0.145 
  (0.340)  (0.419)  (0.352) 
       
Depressive 
symptoms (0/1) 
0.231  0.170  0.224 
  (0.422)  (0.376)  (0.417) 
       
Year of birth  1941.2  1945.2  1941.7 
  (21.98)  (9.896)  (20.90) 
       
Female  0.545  0.566  0.548 
  (0.498)  (0.496)  (0.498) 
       
House had poor 
standard 
0.274  0.117  0.254 
  (0.446)  (0.321)  (0.436) 
       
No books in 
household 
0.489  0.187  0.452 
  (0.500)  (0.390)  (0.498) 
       
Lived with both 
biological 
parents 
0.901  0.876  0.898 
  (0.299)  (0.329)  (0.303) 
Note: Mean and std. deviation in parentheses.   15 
Table 2: Basic Specification 














Panel A: Basic specification           
kiduni18  -0.110  -0.0311**  -0.0465***  -0.0623**  0.0285  -0.0173  -0.0131 
  (0.186)  (0.0127)  (0.0120)  (0.0276)  (0.0210)  (0.0183)  (0.0129) 
               
N  15206  21777  21786  21795  21795  21794  20835 
Panel B: Controlling for childhood SES and family background       
kiduni18  0.114  -0.0324**  -0.0445***  -0.0819***  0.0397**  -0.00859  -0.0122 
  (0.190)  (0.0132)  (0.0118)  (0.0234)  (0.0126)  (0.0199)  (0.0129) 
poorhous  -1.281***  0.00830*  0.0147  0.0473**  0.0330***  -0.0195*  0.000571 
  (0.257)  (0.00449)  (0.0104)  (0.0154)  (0.00949)  (0.00995)  (0.0156) 
nobooks  -2.451***  0.00638  0.0156**  0.0261*  0.0646***  -0.0425***  0.0574*** 
  (0.236)  (0.00503)  (0.00661)  (0.0119)  (0.0129)  (0.00528)  (0.00758) 
intactat10  0.324**  -0.00158  -0.00628  0.0445**  -0.0221*  0.0106  -0.0255** 
  (0.109)  (0.00540)  (0.00850)  (0.0141)  (0.0107)  (0.00684)  (0.00925) 
               
N  14881  21326  21326  21326  21326  21326  20405 
Standard errors in parentheses           
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01           
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for country fixed effects, 
cohort fixed effects, country-specific linear cohort trends, and gender. * 10% ** 5% *** 1% 
significance levels.   16 
Table 3: Alternative Specification of Exposure to Unilateral Divorce 














Panel A: Basic specification 
expose18  0.0380  -0.0134**  -0.0149**  -0.0304***  0.000105  -0.00307  0.00221 
  (0.125)  (0.00476)  (0.00474)  (0.00590)  (0.00722)  (0.00380)  (0.00342) 
               
N  15206  21777  21786  21795  21795  21794  20835 
Panel B: Controlling for childhood SES and family background 
expose18  0.0902  -0.0134**  -0.0146***  -0.0355***  -0.000238  -0.000741  0.00267 
  (0.0898)  (0.00528)  (0.00440)  (0.00500)  (0.00778)  (0.00365)  (0.00375) 
               
poorhous  -1.281***  0.00832*  0.0146  0.0474**  0.0333***  -0.0196*  0.000455 
  (0.257)  (0.00451)  (0.0104)  (0.0154)  (0.00956)  (0.00993)  (0.0156) 
               
nobooks  -2.451***  0.00637  0.0156**  0.0261*  0.0646***  -0.0426***  0.0573*** 
  (0.236)  (0.00502)  (0.00663)  (0.0119)  (0.0130)  (0.00527)  (0.00756) 
               
intactat10  0.324**  -0.00148  -0.00617  0.0448**  -0.0222*  0.0106  -0.0255** 
  (0.109)  (0.00542)  (0.00853)  (0.0142)  (0.0107)  (0.00685)  (0.00924) 
               
N  14881  21326  21326  21326  21326  21326  20405 
               
Standard errors in parentheses           
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01           
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for country fixed effects, 
cohort fixed effects, country-specific linear cohort trends, and gender. 
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Table 4: More Flexible Country-Specific Cohort Trends 
               














Panel A: basic specification (linear country-specific cohort trends)       
kiduni18  -0.110  -0.0311**  -0.0465***  -0.0623**  0.0285  -0.0173  -0.0131 
  (0.186)  (0.0127)  (0.0120)  (0.0276)  (0.0210)  (0.0183)  (0.0129) 
Panel B: quadratic country-specific cohort trends         
kiduni18  -0.0883  -0.0300**  -0.0423***  -0.0804***  0.0420**  -0.0118  -0.0149 
  (0.197)  (0.0132)  (0.0117)  (0.0250)  (0.0145)  (0.0190)  (0.0135) 
Panel C: cubic country-specific cohort trends         
kiduni18  -0.00965  -0.0255**  -0.0180  -0.0427  0.0212  0.00403  -0.0104 
  (0.255)  (0.0114)  (0.0298)  (0.0475)  (0.0158)  (0.0271)  (0.0159) 
N  15206  21777  21786  21795  21795  21794  20835 
               
Standard errors in parentheses           
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01           
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for country fixed effects,  
cohort fixed effects, country-specific linear cohort trends, and gender. 
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Table 5: Dropping Southern Europe 














Panel A: Basic specification 
kiduni18  -0.255*  -0.0229**  -0.0418***  -0.0558  0.0101  0.00936  -0.00515 
  (0.121)  (0.00943)  (0.0102)  (0.0319)  (0.0217)  (0.0182)  (0.0210) 
               
N  10376  14545  14553  14561  14561  14560  13971 
Panel B: Controlling for childhood SES and family background 
kiduni18  0.0567  -0.0221*  -0.0360**  -0.0756**  0.0207  0.0210  -0.00499 
  (0.174)  (0.0102)  (0.0109)  (0.0266)  (0.0119)  (0.0193)  (0.0228) 
               
poorhous  -1.489***  -0.00168  0.00554  0.0513**  0.0406**  -0.0369***  -0.0186 
  (0.288)  (0.00278)  (0.00917)  (0.0155)  (0.0128)  (0.00932)  (0.0214) 
               
nobooks  -2.403***  0.00314  0.0139  0.00871  0.0716***  -0.0435***  0.0543*** 
  (0.295)  (0.00714)  (0.00919)  (0.0132)  (0.0151)  (0.00714)  (0.00956) 
               
intactat10  0.413***  0.00167  -0.00554  0.0586***  -0.0125  0.00903  -0.0300** 
  (0.0999)  (0.00643)  (0.00892)  (0.0150)  (0.0121)  (0.00868)  (0.0109) 
               
N  10102  14171  14171  14171  14171  14171  13616 
               
Standard errors in parentheses           
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01           
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for country fixed effects,  
cohort fixed effects, country-specific linear cohort trends, and gender.   19 
Table 6: Sweden and Denmark only 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  iscedy_r  evrmarr  haskids  neversmok  overweight  saheu  eurodcat 
Panel A: Basic specification 
kiduni18  -0.758*  -0.0238**  -0.0278*  -0.133**  0.0648*  0.0363**  0.0266 
  (0.0792)  (0.000980)  (0.00268)  (0.00493)  (0.0103)  (0.00174)  (0.0163) 
               
N  2573  3887  3890  3890  3890  3890  3773 
Panel B: Controlling for childhood SES and family background 
kiduni18  -0.774*  -0.0242**  -0.0283*  -0.132**  0.0661  0.0397**  0.0375 
  (0.0897)  (0.00128)  (0.00395)  (0.00483)  (0.0114)  (0.00256)  (0.0162) 
               
poorhous  -1.022  0.000844  -0.0224  0.0255***  0.0493*  -0.0548  -0.0306** 
  (0.169)  (0.000663)  (0.0129)  (0.0000795)  (0.00761)  (0.0226)  (0.00194) 
               
nobooks  -1.754**  -0.0180  -0.00370  -0.0102  0.0744  -0.0426  0.0319 
  (0.0592)  (0.0160)  (0.0122)  (0.00198)  (0.0129)  (0.0247)  (0.0211) 
               
intactat10  0.435  0.00251  -0.0162  0.0953  -0.00307  0.0156**  -0.0464 
  (0.313)  (0.0176)  (0.0188)  (0.0386)  (0.0200)  (0.000345)  (0.0181) 
               
N  2497  3783  3783  3783  3783  3783  3672 
               
Standard errors in parentheses           
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01           
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for country fixed effects,  
cohort fixed effects, country-specific linear cohort trends, and gender. 
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